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Carbon dioxide emissions from international avia-
tion are small but growing much faster than other
greenhouse gas emissions. To date, aviation emis-
sions have been excluded from climate policy, inter
alia because it is an international industry regulated
by consensus. Recently, however, the European
Commission has announced that aviation emissions
will be part of the European Trading System (ETS)
for carbon dioxide. Specifically, permits will be need-
ed for all emissions from flights from and to an air-
port in the European Union.1 This note investigates
the implications for emissions, for travel patterns,
and for the financial position of airlines.
This note builds on Tol (forthcoming). That paper
was written when taxing aviation emissions was a
remote prospect, and the policy scenarios there dif-
fer from the current policy proposals – particularly,
the previous paper considers a global tax, while the
current paper studies a European permit trade.
Similarly, Michaelis (1997), Olsthoorn (2001) and
Wit et al. (2002) analyse different policies than what
is currently being proposed.
The paper only considers international aviation
demand by tourists. Domestic air travel is excluded,
as is travel for business purposes. There is a global
database of reasonable quality on international
tourist travel – but there is nothing of the sort for
domestic tourist travel or for business travel. So, a
choice has to be made between comprehensiveness
in a geographic sense, and comprehensiveness in a
travel sense. The current paper opts for the former,
which of course does not make the latter less rele-
vant. Note that business travellers are less likely to
respond to price changes than are tourists.
The paper only considers shifts in demand induced
by an increase in the price of air travel. Of course,
carbon pricing would also induce changes in flight
behaviour, aircraft technology, and perhaps fuel
choice – each of which would reduce carbon dioxide
emissions (Bates et al. 2000; Wit et al. 2002, 2005;
Wulff and Hourmouziadis 1997).This would dampen
the price signal to the traveller, so that this model
overestimates the economic impacts but underesti-
mates the effect on emissions. The results suggest
that this is not a major problem. Note that aircraft
and fuel are fixed in the short-term. Airport author-
ities and air control determine the most crucial
aspects of flight behaviour – taxiing, take-off, and
landing – although the airlines pay for the emissions;
little change is expected, therefore.
The model
Simulations are done with the Hamburg Tourism
Model (HTM), version 1.3. Previous work focussed
on climate change (Hamilton et al. 2005a,b; Bigano
et al. 2005). The current version is designed to
analyse climate policy (Tol forthcoming).
HTM predicts the numbers of domestic and interna-
tional tourists from 207 countries, and traces the
international tourists to their destinations. Tourism
demand is primarily driven by per capita income.
Destination choice is driven by income, climate,
coast, and travel time and cost. Carbon pricing would
increase the travel cost, but leave other factors unaf-
fected. See Tol (forthcoming) for details.
Data were primarily taken from WTO (2003) and
EuroMonitor (2002). Behavioural relationships were
estimated for 1995 (the most recent year with rea-
sonably complete data coverage), and used to inter-
polate the missing observations. Observations on
travel time and travel cost are very limited. Here,
travel time and cost are assumed to be linear in the
distance between airports, using data for Heathrow,
Europe’s busiest airport.The airfare elasticity of des-
tination choice equals – 1.50 + 0.14lny, where y is the
average per capita income in the country of origin.
For UK travellers, the elasticity equals – 0.45, which
compares well to the estimates of Oum et al. (1990),
Crouch (1995), Witt and Witt (1995) and Wohl-
gemuth (1997).
The model was used to predict tourist numbers for
1980, 1985, and 1990, and shown to have a predictive
power of well above 70 percent.
Carbon dioxide emissions equal 6.5 kg C per pas-
senger for take-off and landing, and 0.02 kg per pas-
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senger-kilometre (Pearce and Pearce 2000). No hol-
idays at less than 500 km distance (one way) are
assumed to be by air, and all holidays beyond 5000
km are assumed to be by air; in between the fraction
increases linearly with distance. For island nations,
the respective distance are 0 and 500 km.Total mod-
elled emissions in 2000 are 140 million metric tonnes
of carbon, which is 2.1 percent of total emissions
from fossil fuels. This is from tourism only. Total
international aviation is responsible for some 3 per-
cent of global emissions.2 There are no published
numbers on the share of tourism in total interna-
tional travel.
Scenarios and Results
Scenarios
The model was calibrated for 1995. From 1995 to
2004, populations and economies grow as observed.
Between 2005 and 2020, growth rates gradually con-
verge to the SRES A1 scenario (Nakicenovic and
Swart 2001). The price of oil is kept constant at the
price in September 2006. Results are presented for
2010 only, and in deviations from the baseline, so that
the baseline details are largely irrelevant.
Eight different prices of carbon permits are consid-
ered, all in euro per tonne of carbon: 0, 5, 10, 18, 25,
50, 100, and 240 €/tC; 0 €/tC is the base case; 5 €/tC
(25 €/tC) corresponds to the median in Tol’s (2005)
meta-analysis of the marginal damage cost of carbon
for a 3 percent (1 percent) pure rate of time prefer-
ence; 240 €/tC is the value recommended by Stern et
al. (2006); 18 €/tC was the price
of carbon permits in the ETS at
January 5, 2007; 10, 50 and
100 €/tC are round numbers in
between.
Following the proposal by the
European Commission, permits
are assumed to be needed for all
emissions from flights to and
from any airport in the Euro-
pean Union. Norway has an-
nounced it will join, while Ice-
land and Switzerland are
assumed to follow suit. People
residing in the European Union
account for 19 percent of all tourism aviation emis-
sions. However, emissions on flights to and from the
EU account for 58 percent of global emissions. The
difference is because Europe is a popular holiday
destination for people from all over the world, and
tourists from outside the EU fly longer distances.
Note that airlines have questioned the jurisdiction of
the European Commission.
Emissions
Figure 1 shows the effect of carbon dioxide emis-
sions trading. The change in global CO2 emissions
is approximately linear in the permit price. This is
no surprise if one considers the scale of change in
emissions: Global emissions from international
tourism aviation fall by less than 0.14 percent if the
permit price is 240 €/tC. If the price of permits is as
it was in early January of 2007, emissions fall by
0.01 percent. For emissions by EU residents, the
respective numbers are 0.28 percent and 0.02 per-
cent.
Tourist numbers
The change in international arrivals in the European
Union is larger than the change in emissions, as non-
EU tourists choose the fly to other destinations. Still
numbers are small, less than a 0.6 percent drop. The
reduction in tourist numbers is not evenly spread in
Europe. Peripheral island nations such as Cyprus,
Malta, and Ireland see the largest reductions
(– 1.16 percent, – 1.04 percent and – 0.90 percent, for
240 €/tC). Slovakia (– 0.43 percent) is affected least
– generally, central countries that can also be
reached by car or train face below-average impacts.
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EMISSIONS AS A FUNCTION OF PERMIT PRICE
global aviation carbon emissions (% change)
Source: Own calculation.
permit price (€/tC)
Figure 1
2 See http://themes.eea.europa.eu/En-
vironmental_issues/climate/indicators.
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Countries outside the EU would attract more
tourists – the number of European tourists would
fall only slightly as these tourists pay for their carbon
emissions wherever they go, but tourists from China,
Japan and the USA would be diverted from Europe
to other countries. Nepal and South Korea gain more
than 1 percent for a 240 €/tC permit price.
Airlines
HTM does not explicitly include airline behaviour,
but the observed behaviour of power utilities in the
current ETS may be a good analogue for what will
happen in the air travel market. As demand is price
inelastic, the costs of carbon permits are by and
large passed on to electricity consumers. This is
because the effect on the price of electricity is too
small to have much effect on competition. In air
travel, the price effect is even smaller, while airlines’
emissions are more homogenous so that the compe-
tition effect is smaller too. It is therefore safe to
assume that the price of permits will be passed on to
the travellers.
Currently, permits are grand-parented in the ETS,
that is, companies receive their permits for free; and
the amount of permits is proportional to the emis-
sions in a base year. To date, allocated permits are in
fact almost equal to the expected emissions in the
target year – the basic reason why the permit price is
so low.
Under these assumptions, Figure 2 shows the value
of the grandparented permits to the airline industry
as a function of the permit price. At the permit price
of early January 2007, the airline industry would be
given assets with a total value of €3.0 billion per
year. At the permit price advocated by Stern et al.
(2006), the subsidy would amount to €39.6 billion. In
comparison, the US industry received a hand-out of
€1.9 billion in response to the 9/11 terrorist attack on
the World Trade Center.3
An annual subsidy of this size to incumbents would
increase the barriers to entry for new airlines.
Grandparenting similarly rewards slow-growing
airlines at the expense of fast-growing ones. Low-
cost carriers face a proportionally higher price
increase than other carriers. These three effects
imply a reduction in competition in the air travel
market. As taxiing, take-off and landing are more
energy-intensive than cruising, tradable permits hit
companies that specialise in short-haul flights rela-
tively harder than companies that specialise in
long-haul flights.
If carbon permits were auctioned rather than grand-
parented, the airline industry would not receive the
wind-fall discussed above. Instead, the money would
flow to the government. If the government spends
that money wisely or cuts taxes, then this corre-
sponds to a redistribution of a relatively small
amount of money from air travellers to the general
public.
Airports
European airports would see a reduction in number
of travellers. As discussed above, the changes in the
number of tourists to and from Europe are very
small. However, the number of transiting passengers
may fall more substantially. Under the proposed
rules, emission permits are need-
ed for the entire trip New York-
Frankfurt-Johannesburg, but
none for the longer trip New
York-Dubai-Johannesburg.
Similarly, a trip London-Dubai-
Sydney would require less car-
bon permits than a trip London-
Singapore-Sydney, but emit
more CO2. Over the longer term,
hubs may develop just beyond
the European Union – as
Switzerland has not entered into
the ETS, Zurich International
Airport may be that hub.0
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Figure 2
3 The Economist, September 15, 2005.
Discussion and conclusion
In sum, including aviation emissions in the European
Trading System for carbon dioxide appears to be nei-
ther effective nor efficient. Of course, the first best
solution for an emission reduction policy is to have a
permit market that covers all emissions, including
those from aviation. However, the current market is
partial, and including aviation should not be the first
priority for extending market coverage.The effect on
emissions is minimal, even if the permit price reach-
es heights that are inconceivable today. If this were
the only drawback, one may dismiss the inclusion of
aviation emissions in the ETS as largely irrelevant,
but a step in the right direction. However, in the cur-
rent regime of grandparenting permits, this policy is
in fact tantamount to a substantial subsidy to the air-
line industry – at the expense of travellers and with-
out perceptible gains for the environment. European
politicians would create the impression of leadership
on climate policy while in fact contributing almost
nothing to emission reduction.
The results presented here are uncertain and
require substantial caveats. A sensitivity analysis on
the many assumptions is not given. However, Tol
(forthcoming) shows that the sensitivity of the
results is less than an order of magnitude – even if
the impact of carbon pricing on emissions were ten
times larger, it would still be very small. The lack of
technological and behavioural responses in the
model seems to be the most significant omissions –
but the stock of aircraft turns over only very slowly,
while taxiing, take-off and landing behaviour is in
fact not affected by the proposed carbon pricing.
Therefore, including aviation emissions in the ETS
will, at best, have no effect on emissions and, at
worst, have no effect on emissions but give a hand-
some subsidy to the airlines.
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